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Abstract
Risk-based approaches to governance are widely promoted as universally applicable foundations
for improving the quality, efficiency, and rationality of governance across policy domains. Premised
on the idea that governance cannot eliminate all adverse outcomes, these approaches provide a
method for establishing priorities and allocating scarce resources, and, in so doing, rationalise the
limits of what governance interventions can, and should, achieve. Yet cursory observation suggests
that risk-based approaches have spread unevenly across countries. Based on a comparison of the
UK, France, and Germany, this article explores the ways in which, and why, such approaches have
“colonised” governance regimes in the UK, but have had much more limited application in France
and Germany.We argue that the institutionally patterned adoption of risk-based governance across
these three countries is related to how entrenched governance norms and accountability structures
within their national polities handle both the identification and acceptance of adverse governance
outcomes.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, “risk” has been promoted as a universal organizing concept for improving
the quality, efficiency, and rationality of governance in ways that far exceed its tradi-
tional association with the environment or health and safety. These new “risk-based”
approaches comprise a wide range of mechanisms of control, most notably taking the
form of what has become known as “risk-based regulation,” but also involving – as the
term “governance” connotes – a plurality of public and private actors, instruments, and
purposes (Braithwaite et al. 2007). What they have in common is that they are premised
on the beguilingly simple idea that governance cannot, and indeed, should not, aim to
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eliminate all potential harms or more generally, “adverse outcomes” (Graham 2010).
Rather, in an adaption of Paracelsus’ maxim – the likely dose makes the poison – “risk-
based” approaches pay attention to both the probability and impact of potential adverse
outcomes. In so doing, risk analysis is promoted as a method for framing all aspects of
governance activities.
Risk-based approaches have become popular in many countries, such as the UK,
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, and across domains as diverse as child protection,
housing, finance, and utility regulation (Rothstein et al. 2006; Black 2010). Likewise, risk
analysis has become a central idea for the international “better regulationmovement” and
a general principle of corporate governance in the private and public sectors. For
example, the OECD argues that a “risk-based approach to the design of regulatory
management and compliance strategies . . . can improve the welfare of citizens by pro-
viding better protection from hazards and more efficient services from government”
(OECD 2010, p. 11). Indeed, the World Trade Organization (WTO) insists that import
restrictions must be based on an assessment of risk to combat trade protectionism, and
in the 1990s forced the EU to comply following a successful complaint by the US over an
EU ban on meat containing artificial beef hormones.
While much attention has been paid to the normative rationales for risk-based
approaches, less attention has been paid to the extent to which they are able to challenge
institutionally embedded expectations of governance across different national polities. In
this article, we start to fill that gap by exploring the extent to which risk-based approaches
have been adopted within the UK, France, and Germany. Cursory observation suggests
that such approaches have found much more restricted application in France and
Germany than in the UK. Our analysis suggests that the patterned adoption of risk-based
governance across these three countries is related to how entrenched governance norms
and accountability demands within their national polities handle both the identification
and acceptance of adverse governance outcomes. This analysis not only questions
assumptions about the universality of, and convergence towards, risk-based governance
across national settings, but also potentially offers an important insight into the institu-
tional logics that underlie the concept of “risk governance” itself. In so doing, it contrib-
utes to nascent research on how governance manages its own limits and failures (Jessop
2000; Hood 2011).
2. The emergence of risk analysis as a “universal” policy instrument
Risk analysis has long been associated with the governance of environmental and human
health and safety hazards, such as radiation, food, and chemicals. In the 1980s, the US
National Research Council’s (NRC) landmark “Red Book” set out what became the “gold
standard” of risk analysis in an effort to help the US Environmental Protection Agency
defend chemical exposure limits in the face of legal challenge (NRC 1983). But in recent
years, risk-based approaches have been applied to much wider policy-contexts as a way of
rationalizing the management of the puzzles, conflicts, and trade-offs that inevitably
constrain governance interventions.
The normative rationale for risk-based approaches rests on the idea that efforts to
reduce adverse governance outcomes to zero tend to be sub-optimal because they can be
disproportionately costly to achieve, perversely create other risks, or distract attention
from more serious problems (Viscusi 1995; Sunstein 2002; Baldwin & Black 2010; Black
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& Baldwin 2012; Graham 2010). Proponents argue that it is better, instead, to target
governance activities and resources towards the greatest harms or threats to achieving
policy objectives. By defining what adverse outcomes can be counted as successes or
failures – that is, acceptable or unacceptable risks – risk-based approaches are held to
improve the accountability of decisionmaking by providing formal ex-ante rationaliza-
tions of the limits of what governance interventions can, and should, seek to achieve.
The ostensibly universal “rational” appeal of risk-based approaches points towards a
potential convergence of the ways in which governance problems are framed and solu-
tions sought across policy domains and national contexts. In particular, such approaches
can find application across the three essential components of control that, from a cyber-
netic perspective, any complete governance regime must possess (Hood et al. 2001). In
analysing governance problems, risk-based approaches probabilistically qualify predic-
tions, such as which areas are most likely to flood or which firms are most likely to
mis-sell financial products. In setting governance goals, risk-based approaches express how
far governance should intervene to manage, rather than eliminate, adverse outcomes,
such as setting acceptable probabilities of cancer from exposure to toxic chemicals or
acceptable probabilities of financial meltdown from the use of complex financial instru-
ments. Likewise, in modifying governed behaviours, risk-based approaches can help allo-
cate scarce compliance resources to achieve optimal, rather than complete, achievement
of policy goals, such as targeting anti-terrorist campaigns on communities deemed sus-
ceptible to violent radicalization or targeting child-protection interventions on those
children most vulnerable to abuse.
Such normative rationales have underpinned more coercive drivers of risk-based
governance in the form of hard mandate and soft expectations within international fora,
and national, sectoral, and professional contexts. For example, the EC has been promot-
ing risk-based approaches, such as risk-based enforcement of food-safety and environ-
mental regulation, although its application across domains has proved uneven (Lofstedt
2011). Some countries, such as the UK, require regulatory enforcement across all policy
domains to be risk-based. Risk management has become central to corporate codes of
governance inmany developed countries. Even professionals are under pressure to proba-
bilistically qualify their advice for fear of criminal prosecution, as Italian seismologists are
now facing for their reassuring advice to L’Aquila city-officials prior to the devastating
2009 earthquake (Nosengo 16 February 2012).
Others suggest, however, that the growing focus on risk may be driven less by its
analytical potential than as a symbol of rational decisionmaking. Power (2007), for
example, argues that in the face of increasing scrutiny and legitimacy pressures, risk-
based governance practices offer bureaucracies defensive decisionmaking rationales that
carry the veneer of technocratic legitimacy irrespective of their actual methodological
value (Porter 1995). There is certainly no shortage of academics, consultants, and think
tanks “selling” risk management solutions to organizations and governments that are
seeking to manage wider legitimacy problems.
While such drivers suggest international convergence towards risk-based governance,
there are reasons why its adoption might be expected to be institutionally patterned and
geographically uneven. After all, governance regimes comprise complex arrays of organi-
sations, practices, and animating ideas that can resist or shape the uptake of governance
innovations (Hood et al. 2001; Black et al. 2005). For example, fear of public pillory can
make it difficult for decisionmakers to frame policy in terms of acceptable probabilities of
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deaths, financial losses or other adverse governance outcomes. Likewise, private interest
groups may advocate risk-based approaches to avoid burdensome rules, but – sometimes
together with public groups – may also resist them in order to avoid lowering regulatory
barriers to competition (Vogel 1995). Still others have pointed to bureaucratic cultures
that resist the prioritisation of the greatest risks facing society (Breyer 1993). Indeed,
some commentators argue that changing configurations of private and public pressures,
particularly in response to scandals and tragedies, can help explain changing national
patterns of risk governance over time (Vogel 2012).
The adoption of risk-based approaches to governance may also depend on their “fit”
with deeper institutional contexts, practices, and philosophies of governance (Strang &
Meyer 1993). After all, risk-based approaches are not neutral devices, but policy tools,
which as Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007) argue, embody particular ideas about the
purposes of governance and relationships between “governors” and “governed” that may
not find universal application. In particular, the extent to, or form in which, risk has
emerged as a central organizing concept of governance may be less related to the simple
promulgation of a rational normative principle, than to particular institutional contexts
in which ex-ante risk-based rationalizations of the limits of what governance can, or
should, achieve are both institutionally needed and acceptable.
Building on that idea, we have argued elsewhere that the striking “colonization” of
governance by risk ideas in the UK and other Anglo-Saxon countries in recent years can
be related to enhanced cultures of scrutiny and accountability, which have transformed
traditionally opaque governance behaviours into recorded successes and failures and
increased the salience of blame (Rothstein et al. 2006; see also Hood & Lodge 2006; Hood
2011).We have argued that risk tools are attractive, at least in principle, because they offer
decisionmakers a means for limiting potential blame by reframing adverse governance
outcomes in more differentiated terms of acceptable and unacceptable risk. Indeed, in
contrast to the conventional wisdom that risk is an independent variable on which the
character of accountability depends, accountability demands may be an independent
variable on which the growth and application of risk ideas depend.
Little attention, however, has been paid to how far such risk-based rationales “fit” the
governance contexts across national polities. In the 1980s, pioneering research on envi-
ronmental regulation observed how the relatively transparent, formalised, and adversarial
political system in the US favoured the development of quantitative-risk-analysis, while
consensual European governance styles favoured negotiated or paternalistic solutions
(Kelman 1981; Brickman et al. 1985; Vogel 1986; O’Riordan & Wynne 1987; Jasanoff
1990, 2007). Since then, of course, “risk” concerns have risen up international agendas,
the EU has come to dominate many domains of risk regulation, and “good governance”
doctrines that emphasize transparency and accountability have become de rigueur. Yet, to
date, no comparative research has sought to explore whether the emergence of risk-based
approaches to governance in the UK has been mirrored in other member state contexts,
nor for that matter, at the level of the EC.
In this article, we take a first step in addressing that gap by exploring the extent to
which risk-based approaches have penetrated governance regimes in the UK, France, and
Germany. All three are “advanced” liberal democracies and EU member states facing
similar pressures to adopt risk-based approaches. For example, they have all experienced
high profile governance failures, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), E.
coli, and contaminated blood, that have put pressure on them to improve the rationality
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of decisionmaking. They are also all subject to fiscal pressures and neoliberal managerial
reforms to promote entrepreneurialism and make governance more economically effi-
cient. All three are also under pressure to improve the transparency and accountability of
decisionmaking processes and outcomes from a wide range of societal and government
audiences, including international actors, such as the EU, WTO, and rating-agencies.
The three countries, however, are also characterized by different governance tradi-
tions that may influence their receptiveness to risk-based approaches. The UK has a
managerial orientation in public administration after years of experiments with New
Public Management and is characterized by strong transparency and accountability pres-
sures. France, by contrast, has a technocratic tradition of governance with a concentration
of decisionmaking power in an opaque executive. Germany, meanwhile, has a juridified
and fragmented style of decisionmaking.
As such, the three countries offer interesting cases through which to explore the
factors shaping the adoption of risk-based approaches to governance. We should note,
however, that although we pay attention to a broad range of governance activities across
the three core components of governance control noted above, we do not offer a system-
atic examination across policy domains in each country. Rather, our exploration is
tentative in nature, in order to consider whether it is possible to discern patterns that
could be tested in later systematic research.
3. Three country case-studies
3.1. UK
Until only relatively recently in the UK, risk-based approaches to governance were con-
fined to just a few policy domains that were dominated by decisionmaking cultures that
relied heavily on science, engineering, and economics, such as road safety policy and
occupational health and safety. In general, governance across and within policy domains
tended to be marked by diverse philosophies and practices towards the management of
adverse outcomes (Hood et al. 2001). For example, some policy domains were marked by
paternalistic doctrines of protection, such as flooding where engineers sought in vain to
build enough dams to keep Britain dry. Other policy domains were marked by the
discretionary exercise of professional judgment, such as probation, where officials sought
to balance the rehabilitation of ex-offenders into the community against public protec-
tion. Still other domains were marked by more political and ad hoc decisionmaking, such
as the control of dangerous dogs (e.g. Hood et al. 2000).
In recent years, however, the concepts and tools of risk analysis have increasingly
colonized core functions of governance across the public and private sectors; both to
better target governance interventions, but also to qualify expectations of what gover-
nance can, and should, achieve. There has certainly been no shortage of exhortations by
politicians and public commentators that society needs to “learn to live with risk” to
ensure that creativity in the private and public sectors is not stifled (e.g. Blair 2005). Risk
analysis is regularly used to qualify advice to government and the public about adverse
events in probabilistic terms, be it the likelihood of serious flooding, terrorist attacks or
changes in GDP. Service delivery, inspection, and enforcement activities across policy
domains, from education to social services, are required to be risk-based in determining
their priorities and activities. Likewise, risk-based rationales for policymaking are
entrenched across regulatory agencies and have even penetrated central government
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departments to manage what have been termed “policy risks” (Rothstein & Downer
2012).
At least three broad factors have shaped the focus on risk in recent years. The first
factor is arguably the legacy of high profile crises across a wide range of policy domains.
The most notable crisis was BSE, which spectacularly nailed years of paternalistic reas-
surances about food safety as hubris and contributed to the downfall of the Conservative
government in 1997. The subsequent New Labour administration was likewise shaken by
the fuel protests in 2000 that almost brought the country to a halt, the 2001 foot-and-
mouth crisis that closed down swathes of the countryside, and a number of disastrous
floods. These crises focused government attention on risk analysis to help build what
management consultants like to call a “no surprises culture,” in which adverse events can
at least be better anticipated, if not avoided. Indeed, the Cabinet Office established a
National Risk Register in 2008 that used “probability-x-impact” frameworks to assess a
wide range of national security threats; effectively framing the UK as a vast risk manage-
ment project.
Second, risk-based approaches have emerged in an ideological climate that has
favored greater economic rationality in governance. In particular, the UK’s variously
incarnated “deregulation,” “better regulation,” and “modernizing government” agendas
have promoted risk-based approaches as a means of making regulatory interventions
more “targeted” and “proportionate.” In the 1990s, for example, the Health and Safety
Executive, as a leading advocate of risk-based regulation, took a major role in a series of
cross-government reviews of risk assessment in government (e.g. see ILGRA 1996). That
work most notably culminated in the Hampton Review (Hampton 2005), which led to
the mandatory adoption of risk-based approaches to regulatory inspection and enforce-
ment across policy domains.
In parallel, a number of government initiatives from the late 1990s sought to apply
lessons from private sector risk management standards and practices – which had them-
selves emerged following a series of corporate failures such as the collapse of Bank for
Credit and Commerce International – to the management of government business itself
(e.g. ICAEW 1999; UK Cabinet Office 1999, 2002; Hood & Rothstein 2000). Risk man-
agement was seen as providing a check against bureaucratic cultures that swung too
readily between the reckless and the risk averse, and in so doing, could help build
entrepreneurialism within government (BRC 2006). Indeed, as Black has observed, risk
became a central motif of attempts to rationally structure the management of public
organizations in the absence of “the discipline of competition, profits or share prices”
(Black 2006, p. 2).
A third factor concerns structural reforms to UK government that have increased
pressures on decisionmakers to find ways of accounting explicitly for decisionmaking
processes and outcomes (Power 1997; Hood et al. 1999). Historically, the traditional
opaque and informal “club-culture” of UK government – as Moran (2003) has character-
ized it – tended to screen the limits and failures of governance from view, with Ministers
only expected to take responsibility for their own and their civil servants’ actions when
failures became manifest. In recent decades, however, the introduction of managerial
approaches to the control of public services, exemplified by New Public Management
philosophies, has routinized the forensic examination of decisionmaking processes and
outcomes and, in so doing, amplified the salience of failure (Hood et al. 1999). For
example, within central government, civil servants are increasingly held to account for
Risk and the limits of governanceH. Rothstein et al.
© 2012 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd220
their actions, while marketization and contractual models of public service delivery have
put greater pressure on front-line services to account for outcomes. Likewise, greater
external public scrutiny, such as through Freedom of Information legislation and perfor-
mance indicators, has enhanced accountability pressures on decisionmaking processes.
In that context, risk management offers decisionmakers a means for reconciling
competing pressures in modern UK government to be accountable while limiting poten-
tial blame, by reframing and differentiating between adverse governance in terms of
“acceptable” and “unacceptable” risk. For example, regulatory agencies have reframed the
objects of regulation as risks as a way of rationalizing their aims, trade-offs, and perfor-
mance as bureaucratically rational and defensible in the absence of electoral mandate.
The UK’s Health and Safety Executive, for example, elaborated a risk-based model for
regulatory action when it was called to justify its decisionmaking to a public inquiry into
the building of Sizewell-B nuclear power station in the 1980s (HSE 1998). In central
ministries, risk management offers civil servants a strategy for limiting their enhanced
“blame-ability” if the Minister’s red briefcase fails to shield them. Likewise, risk-based
decisionmaking provides a means for front-line services to rationalize the inevitable
limits and failures of policy implementation and service delivery, be it in enforcing food
safety law, regulating social care, or managing public housing.
As a consequence, risk discourses have increasingly displaced traditional policy dis-
courses, such as “safety” and “security,” and, in so doing, subtly reshaped the social
contract between government and public about their respective expectations and respon-
sibilities. For example, the environment ministry’s euphemistic phrase “making space for
water” captures a conceptual shift from “flood defense” to “flood risk management,” in
which government has explicitly sought to define the limits of its flood management
responsibilities (Defra 2005). Similarly, terrorism is discussed increasingly in terms of risk
management, rather than national security, as the security services have become increas-
ingly accountable for their actions. Likewise, at the sharp end of policy implementation,
risk-based practices have been shaping expectations of enforcement and service delivery.
For example, when violent criminals have committed offences on release from prison,
probation officers have notably defended their actions in terms of “managing risk” rather
than securing public safety.
Of course, it is important to qualify the impact of risk ideas in the UK, given that
governance activities are held to account through multiple bureaucratic, legal, and social
mechanisms (see Black 2008). Civil servants are rarely confident that their managers, the
public or the courts will accept that they took a calculated risk if something goes wrong.
There is certainly no shortage of examples of politicians demanding zero tolerance of
failure, from scapegoating social services following child abuse tragedies, to demands for
expensive train safety systems following multiple-fatality train accidents (e.g. Butler 27
May 2011). Equally, risk-based rationalizations of governance action that tolerate failure
can conflict with the reputational needs of regulated sectors. For example, risk-based
regulation of the medical profession has the potential to undermine the Hippocratic
Oath’s “guarantee” of professional conduct (Hutter & Lloyd-Bostock 2008). Likewise,
risk-based governance rationales can conflict with public demands for equal treatment,
be it protection from flooding irrespective of location or protection from intrusive state
population-profiling techniques to detect potential terrorists.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to examine how such conflicts are managed
in practice, it is worth noting that they have not diminished the spread and penetration
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of risk ideas (e.g. Rothstein et al. 2006). Anticipated ex post judgments of failure are
themselves increasingly reconceived in terms of ex-ante risk rationalizations. For
example, government lawyers are increasingly framing anticipated adverse legal judg-
ments as “legal risks” that have defined probabilities and costs (Rothstein & Downer
2012). Likewise, the UK’s Health and Safety Executive factors what it terms “societal
concerns” into its risk calculations to respond to public anxiety around issues, such as
children’s adventure centres, that they consider adequately regulated, but create reputa-
tional problems for the agency (HSE 2002). The absorption of such “institutional risks”
that threaten government itself into risk calculations strongly suggests that risk manage-
ment’s euphemistic displacement of “failure” from the rhetoric of governance may go a
long way to explain its popularity in the UK.
3.2. France
Over the last twenty years or so, France, like the UK, has been hit by a number of crises
and scandals – particularly in the public health domain – that have dented confidence in
the capacity of the state to protect its population. In 1986, for example, government
officials attempted to claim that the radioactive cloud from Chernobyl had not crossed
the French border (Liberatore 1999). In 1999, a former prime minister and several
ministers were prosecuted for negligence in permitting haemophiliacs to be given HIV-
contaminated blood products. Then came the high economic toll on French farmers of
BSE; the asbestos scandal that revealed decades-long government failures to prevent
exposures that may result in 100,000 deaths; and the 2003 heat wave that claimed 15,000
lives and left the government accused of providing inadequate warnings. These crises
became public symbols of state failure, creating both external and internal pressures for
governance reform (Borraz 2008).
At first sight, one might expect that the French “technocratic” tradition of public
administration would be well suited to the adoption of risk-based rationales because of
its concentration of power in an elite corps of civil servants who work within institutional
safeguards designed to insulate them from political pressures. Indeed, Breyer (1993) – a
US Supreme Court judge and leading advocate of risk-based governance – has argued
that the French Conseil d’Etat, which acts as a supreme arbiter of the “general interest,”
should serve as an institutional model for combating the often observed irrationalities of
risk governance in the US.
Certainly, the French administration responded to these crises in the late 1990s by
adopting the NRC’s “gold standard” of risk analysis as the cornerstone of reforms, with
four new agencies created to assess risks in the domains of food, pharmaceuticals, envi-
ronment, workplace safety, and disease control. Unlike the UK, however, risk-based
approaches remained limited to those policy domains in which the government had been
seen to fail (Borraz 2008). Moreover, reforms were restricted to the assessment of risk:
they did not extend to policymaking, enforcement, and inspection, which remained the
responsibility of central ministries and their field services. The only major exceptions
have been where risk-based approaches have been internationally mandated, such as the
EU regime for food safety inspections.
In order to explain the limited penetration of risk-based approaches to governance in
France, it is worth considering the way in which they conflict with four entrenched
institutional features of the French state. The first feature is the culturally established
commitment or “promise” by the French state to provide security for its population.
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Security has always been a key concern of the French state; indeed, failure to provide
protection would imply significant weakness. In recent years, however, that commitment
has come to embrace a wide set of issues where the competence of the state has been
questioned. For example, following the health crises of the 1980s and 90s, French authori-
ties used the health domain to demonstrate their willingness and capacity to act to protect
the public. An unintended effect, however, was that while there was extensive effort to
assess health risks, the commitment to public security left no room for compromise with
other objectives, such as employment or economic development (Borraz & Gilbert 2008).
This feature of the French state works against risk-based approaches, which explicitly
eschew absolute principles, such as security or safety.
A second significant feature of the French state is the priority given to maintaining
“public order;” a principle that is defined in administrative law, has been interpreted by
the courts, and is given great significance by state officials (Worms 1966). This principle
underpins a core role of state officials in preventing any event that could create disorder
and undermine the authority of the Republic. From this perspective, risk-based
approaches pose problems because they explicitly reveal and seek to define the limits of
what governance can achieve. For example, as health concerns have become a source of
public controversy, so they have become an issue on which the state has sought to assert
its capacity to govern and to avoid conflicts evolving into crises. As a consequence, the
results of routine state monitoring and enforcement of hazardous industrial activities are
not made public for fear of revealing gaps between the law and actual practices (Bonnaud
2005). Indeed, in the early 2000s, the French Ministry of Agriculture refused to share
performance information on its field services with the food safety agency, because it
neither wanted the agency to supervise its activities, nor run the risk of having the results
publicised (Besançon et al. 2006).
A third feature that works against risk-based governance is the Republican interpre-
tation of “equal rights.” The French constitution prevents the state making distinctions
between citizens according to specific characteristics in order to treat all in the same way;
a principle which is strongly upheld by the Conseil Constitutionnel and administrative
courts. The principle of equal treatment for all, however, can conflict with risk-based
approaches to setting priorities and allocating scarce resources. For example, while the
application of cost-benefit analysis to infrastructure projects was largely developed in
France (Porter 1995), the Anglo-Saxon practice of explicitly valuing life is regarded as a
cultural anathema. Another vivid demonstration was the Minister of Health’s decision to
vaccinate everyone during the 2009 H1N1-flu pandemic rather than the third of the
population needed to provide herd immunity, having no legal grounds to decide which
third should get preferential treatment (Assemblée Nationale 2010).
Finally, a fourth feature of the French state relates to the concept of the “general
interest,”which civil servants are expected to represent and defend, under the supervision
of the Conseil d’Etat. In essence, this concept precedes any type of ideological or private
interest, relying instead on civil servants and elected officials working for the “general
good” on the basis of their personal ethics and rigorous use of evidence. However,
risk-based approaches, as calculative modes of accountability, conflict with this paternal-
istic tradition, which is sustained by the absence of freedom-of-information legislation.
Indeed, civil servants and elected representatives have resisted pressures to introduce
more open and deliberative styles of decisionmaking because they undermine their
privileged role in defining the general interest (Callon et al. 2009).
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These entrenched institutional philosophies and cultures have limited the extent to
which risk-based governance reforms have taken root in France. Instead, the inevitable
limits of governance are dealt with in at least three different ways. A first approach has
been opacity. Rather than explicitly acknowledge the inevitable compromises and trade-
offs between security, economic, social, and organizational concerns in designing and
implementing regulation, officials prefer to keep their actions veiled in secrecy. For
example, cases of non-compliance or regulatory implementation failure in the domains
of food safety and dangerous industrial activities are regularly negotiated behind closed
doors (Lascoumes 1994). In so doing, the state can maintain the illusion that it is offering
security, as long as failure to deliver on that security does not become public.
Indeed, even where risk-based approaches have been internationally mandated,
actual practice has subtly elided trade-offs between risks to society and institutional risks
posed to the state itself. In the case of EU-mandated risk-based food safety inspection, for
example, local state services complement the assessment of food safety risks posed by
businesses with an additional “fudge” risk factor that takes into account the “sensibilities”
of the département (Bonnaud & Coppalle 2010). Such factors can undermine the value of
risk-based approaches in protecting public health if the field-services or the préfet decides
that inspection resources should be directed towards maintaining public order or pro-
tecting their own reputation.
A second approach has been to acknowledge failures, but then identify individuals
that can be held politically or legally accountable. Examples range from the trial of
ministers for their role in the contaminated blood scandal, to the dismissal of the head of
the general health directorate after the 2003 heat wave. But there are many other less-
publicized cases where local préfets or heads of administrative services have been demoted
after mishandling a crisis, such as the 1999 storm that swept through France (Dedieu
2007). In other words, institutional dysfunctions may account for the crisis, but in a long
established bureaucratic tradition, the focus is on finding public officials accountable for
either tolerating such dysfunctions or not preventing the failures becoming public.
A third approach has been to put considerable effort into reactive crisis management
to maintain or restore public order and manage the reputation of Ministries. In an age of
increasing media attention, Ministries from health to education have installed early
warning systems, contingency plans, and dedicated crisis units to catch and respond
quickly to weak signals of impending crises (Fourès 2011). Indeed, the Ministry of
Interior, as the ministry responsible for maintaining public order, takes the lead for crisis
management whatever the nature of the crisis. Increasingly, in situations of uncertainty
or under pressure from social movements,Ministries prefer to be risk averse or invoke the
precautionary principle, even if it means facing later criticism for over-reaction. So far, no
public official in France has ever been sanctioned for being too cautious.
3.3. Germany
“Risk” is certainly no stranger to German political debate, figuring as a central concern of
debates in many policy domains, such as nuclear safety, food safety, the environment,
biotechnology or financial services. Beyond being an object of governance concern,
however, risk-based ideas have also started to play a greater role in framing governance
processes. For example, risk assessment plays an important role in climate change policy,
following the probabilistic, scenario-based approach championed by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In food safety debates, risk assessment plays a
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key role in informing food safety decisionmaking, drawing on risk assessments from the
European Food Safety Agency and corresponding national agencies. Indeed, in 2002, a
new agency was created – the Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR) – whose task is
to provide risk-based scientific advice to the public, government, and other stakeholders
on consumer related issues, ranging from BSE to toys and lipsticks.
However, risk-based approaches have only colonized the core functions of a few
regulatory regimes completely – that is, the processes of risk assessment, policymaking,
and implementation – principally because of international demands. For example, the
Basel-II Accords turned the previously opaque world of financial services regulation into
a risk-based approach under the supervision of BaFin, which was established as one of the
few fully-fledged regulatory agencies in Germany. Like the UK Financial Services Author-
ity, BaFin institutionalized risk-based regulatory approaches to information gathering,
decisionmaking, and enforcement across the financial sector.
Instead, in most domains, risk-based approaches to policymaking and enforcement
fit uneasily with entrenched governance arrangements and practices, for three main
reasons. The first reason concerns the juridified character of German policymaking,
which is heavily constrained both by the interpretation of constitutional and adminis-
trative law by the courts and by a traditionally lawyer-dominated civil service. The
problem is that risk-based “probability-x-impact” frameworks fit awkwardly with the
historically important legal concept of “danger.” As Peter Huber (2009) has discussed,
19th century liberal conceptions of the Prussian state regarded the protection of people
from “dangers” to life, freedom, and property, as one of the few legitimate grounds for
state interference in individuals’ lives. “Dangers”were conceived as those harms that were
likely to occur, and were broadly dealt with in binary terms; if there was no danger then
there were no grounds for state action. The post-war German constitution enshrined that
constraint on state action, albeit qualified by the principle of proportionality. Over time,
however, the state’s “duty of protection” from dangers (Schutzpflicht) came to be under-
stood as forming the constitutional basis for legislation across policy domains, from
nuclear safety to rented accommodation.
While the courts regard dangers as unacceptable, they also recognize that some
degree of “residual risk” is an inevitable condition of life and should be legally toler-
ated. Legal doctrine, however, has great difficulty in using “probability-x-impact”
frameworks to define the boundary between unacceptable “dangers” and acceptable
“risks.” For example, the law is ambiguous when it comes to dealing with what are
known as “nuisances,” which have adverse impacts that do not infringe individuals’
rights, and with “suspected dangers” on which further information is needed (Huber
2009). Within environmental law, for example, the precautionary principle (Vorsorge-
prinzip) was famously established in the 1970s for acting in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty, but the principle has had more uneven application in wider fields of social
regulation (Bora 2007). Likewise, while the concept of danger has a probabilistic
dimension to it, legal doctrine has few tools at its disposal to set numerically acceptable
probabilities as a means of balancing the rights of those creating risks and those
exposed to risks.
Consequently, legal attempts to define the concept of acceptable risk have readily
fallen prey to intractable adversarial conflicts between stakeholders seeking to protect
their conflicting, but constitutionally enshrined, rights to economic activity and health
protection. For example, conflicts over acceptable risk thresholds were central to a
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complex legal conflict that lasted throughout the 1970s–80s, when the anti-nuclear move-
ment challenged the authorities over the risks from nuclear radiation or accidents. Some
administrative courts attempted to define an acceptable probability of an accident as
10-7/yr, while the federal constitutional court attempted to define it in terms of being
“practically unimaginable” and “irrelevant” (Proske 2004, p. 466). Such irresolvable dis-
putes led the federal constitutional court to decide that it should abstain from decisions
on scientific conflicts or disagreements.
That is not to say that acceptable probabilities are never set. Flood protection, for
example, relies on a probabilistic definition of the boundary between unacceptable
“danger” and acceptable “risk.” That boundary has been historically defined as providing
protection against floods that occur once or more in 100 years; that is, just more than the
average lifespan. As Krieger (2012) has pointed out, however, the state’s “duty to protect”
citizens from dangers to life, health, and property, gives rise to expectations that proper-
ties and publics will be protected equally up to that standard, be they in urban centres or
rural areas. The expectation of equal treatment, therefore, works against flood protection
becoming risk-based insofar as it is blind to impact (c.f. Huber 2011).
The second factor that works against risk-based approaches to governance is the
fragmented federal system that distributes competences – depending on policy domain –
across at least three levels of political decisionmaking of Communities, Länder, and the
federal state, as well as across the courts and other actors. Such multi-level political and
legal processes can amplify fundamental uncertainties about the use of risk in decision-
making because of the presence of multiple decisionmakers with varying philosophical
approaches to governing risks and often contradictory interests in the distribution of
risks, costs, and benefits (Lodge 2001). In the case of flood protection, for example, the
veto power of Länder has made Federal resource allocations dependent on Länder popu-
lations, rather than flood risk (Krieger 2012). Even internationally mandated risk-based
approaches to governance can fall foul of constitutional arrangements for their imple-
mentation. One example was resistance by Länder to EU rules on risk-based food safety
inspection on the grounds that they contravened constitutional expectations (Lodge &
Wegrich 2011). Similarly, fragmentation of the German legal system can inhibit the
establishment of common understandings of acceptable risk. For example, according to
the Industrial Code (Gewerbeordnung GewO§24-IV), conditions for licensing industrial
plants should normally involve experts and stakeholders, but as noted in the nuclear case,
consensus over what constitutes acceptable risk has not always been easy to achieve and
disputes have readily spilt over into regional courts that have reached inconsistent deci-
sions (Huber 1998).
The third factor constraining the emergence of risk-based rationales is the form that
transparency and accountability takes in Germany. While transparent legal oversight is
central to decisionmaking, as already discussed, the courts are ill equipped to reconcile
risk ideas with constitutional demands. Under these circumstances, Germany’s corporat-
ist traditions have played an important role in trying to find solutions through negotia-
tions between stakeholder representatives, such as between employers and employees on
workplace safety. Such approaches may go hand-in-hand with risk-based rationales if
they assist stakeholders in achieving their various objectives. However, such approaches
may equally work against risk-based rationales when they strongly rely on established
relationships of trust, strategic bargaining and an emphasis on consensual solutions, all of
which resist formulaic justifications.
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Where social movements have challenged decisionmaking on more intractable, risk-
related issues, it has become customary since the 1980s to hold public hearings that
attempt to bring together scientific expertise – latterly in the form of the BfR – and a wide
range of “civil society” representatives. In such public contexts, risk-based rationales have
become sorely tested, with groups often speaking past each other, rather than seeking
consensus. For example, public hearings on nuclear power and biotechnology have been
marked by social movements placing an emphasis on potential dangers, rather than their
probabilities (Jasanoff 1996; Hocke & Renn 2009). Attempts to address such issues
through regular, but more narrowly constituted expert hearings (Experten-Anhörung) at
the federal or regional level, have equally proved infertile terrain as the concept of expert
has expanded to include ethicists and other professionals who are hostile to risk-based
decisionmaking logics (Bogner 2011).
One consequence of the institutionalization of such iterative, but often failing,
attempts to deal with risk has been the decoupling of these processes from actual deci-
sionmaking, and ultimately a greater emphasis on political decisionmaking (Bora 1999).
One recent example was the government decision to abandon nuclear power following
the Fukushima accident, which was announced a week before the hearings on the risks
from nuclear power were concluded (Spiegel Online 2011a, b). Likewise, the 2002 dev-
astating floods caused by the river Elbe prior to a Federal election led to a political
decision to compensate the victims irrespective of their vulnerability to flooding through
the largest disaster relief fund in German history (Schwarze & Wagner 2004).
These considerations suggest that while risk is a familiar concept in Germany, a set of
institutional factors impede the extent to which it has become an organizing principle of
governance. These factors have little to do with ideological or cultural factors, as is often
argued when British neo-liberalism and the continental provisional state are compared
(Ewald 1986). Rather, resistance appears to be located in the struggles of the German
Rechtsstaat to cope with risk ideas; problems which are amplified by horizontal and
vertical fragmentation of policy responsibilities and accountabilities, and attempts to find
solutions by drawing on corporatist decisionmaking traditions.
4. Examining the institutional logics of risk-based governance
These country sketches provide the basis on which to reflect tentatively on the factors
shaping the adoption of, or resistance to, risk-based approaches to governance across
these national contexts. It is noticeable that risk-based approaches have a much greater
salience in the UK, than in France or Germany. In the UK, risk has become the conceptual
prism through which government has increasingly sought to negotiate its mandate by
subtly shaping the distribution of both rights to protection and responsibilities for
failure. To that end, the language and methods of risk analysis are being used to reframe
the acceptability of adverse outcomes across governance functions in a wide range of
policy domains and organizational contexts. In France and Germany, however, risk analy-
sis is more narrowly operationalized in terms of identifying adverse outcomes to be
avoided than providing a “better governance” rationale for their tolerance; either in
setting policy goals or in the practical implementation of policy. Moreover, in those two
latter countries, such approaches tend to be confined to traditional policy domains of the
environment and human health and safety, except where they have been internationally
mandated.
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The case studies suggest that there are some common pressures shaping the use of risk
analysis as a means of framing information-gathering activities across all three countries.
In particular, the need to develop better techniques to anticipate future adverse outcomes
has been driven in response to notable governance controversies and failures. Such
contexts have created fertile opportunities for the institutionalization and diffusion of
risk analysis as a way of gaining normative legitimacy for new organizational forms of
knowledge production. In so doing, risk provides, at least in principle, a lingua franca for
developing common understandings and approaches across regimes. One example has
been the adoption of international standards of risk analysis by all three governments
when they established new food safety agencies in the aftermath of the BSE crisis (Ansell
& Vogel 2006).
The adoption of risk-based approaches to information gathering as a means of
establishing policy legitimacy is also linked to globalization pressures through the insti-
tutionalization of hard mandate and soft expectations within international contexts. For
example, risk analysis has become a prerequisite for countries to uphold their national
interests at the WTO on matters concerning human health and safety. Likewise, the
enforcement of food, environmental, and financial regulation is, in principle, risk-based
across the EU. More generally, as policy issues such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, global
warming, financial regulation, and even security threats are increasingly framed as risks
in international arenas, so national authorities are likewise under pressure to adopt
similar organizational forms and operating procedures to tackle them.
Lastly, the emergence of risk as a means of better predicting the future can be seen
as a response to enhanced transparency and accountability pressures by limiting the
associated enhanced liabilities when adverse outcomes inevitably materialize. Certainly
in the domains of the environment and human health and safety, for example, the last
two decades have seen expert advisory processes that were traditionally regarded as
opaque and secretive replaced by more transparent and accountable processes.
Examples include the creation of dedicated risk agencies across Europe that have
accountability and transparency built into their guiding missions, and transparency
initiatives such as the Arhus Convention on freedom of access to environmental infor-
mation. Under these circumstances, framing advice to the government and the public
within the language of risk serves to emphasize the limits of expert knowledge and
deflect liabilities for adverse outcomes, such as unpredicted terrorist threats, financial
products that fail to deliver hoped-for returns, or medical interventions that cause
more harm than good.
While those common pressures help explain the adoption of risk-based approaches to
information-gathering activities across all three countries, they struggle to explain the
more patterned emergence of risk-based approaches to optimizing both governance goals
and the achievement of those goals in practice. Rather, the case studies suggest that the
adoption of risk-based approaches for those latter dimensions of governance depend on
their “fit” with governance norms and accountability demands that are deeply entrenched
within national polities.
As far as governance norms are concerned, the case studies show how risk-based
philosophies can conflict with hard-wired constitutional demands and culturally
engrained expectations. In France, the implicit expectation that the state will provide
security for its citizens is antithetical to the explicit tolerance of adverse outcomes.
Indeed, the French state’s emphasis on security in recent years is in striking contrast to the
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UK’s emphasis on risk. Likewise, the norms of risk-based governance conflict with the
rights for equal treatment for all citizens that are enshrined in the French constitution.
What appears to make rational sense from a “risk” perspective, such as vaccinating those
at greatest risk of contagious disease or targeting anti-terrorist activities on groups in
society deemed to pose the greatest threat, is difficult to operationalize in a state that
formally refuses to differentiate between its citizens.
German constitutional expectations create similar normative conflicts with risk-
based approaches to governance. Most obviously, and in an echo of the French emphasis
on“security,” the increasingly widely applied doctrine of Schutzpflicht has emphasized the
state’s “duty of protection” of the public from dangers. That emphasis sits uneasily with
risk-based governance norms, particularly in the absence of a clear means for the German
Rechtsstaat to set a boundary between unacceptable danger and acceptable risk. Likewise,
the “duty of protection” carries with it expectations of equality of treatment, which, as
seen in the flood management case, work against the inherently differentiated nature of
risk-based interventions.
It is worth, however, observing that it is not juridification per se that creates problems
for risk-based governance in Germany. In the US, which is known for its adversarial legal
culture (Kagan 2001), quantitative risk assessment has proved invaluable in navigating
legal conflicts between stakeholders across many environmental and human health and
safety domains.A key difference to note, however, is that while the German judiciary finds
it difficult to balance irreconcilable constitutional rights to life, freedom, and property, in
terms of risk, the US constitution does not present such conflicts, focusing on prohibiting
constraints on individuals, such as the right to bear arms, rather than the protection of
their health and welfare.
In contrast to France and Germany,UK governance norms can cope with the idea that
the state can sanction activities that may entail harms or adverse outcomes. That is not to
say that demands for safety and equal treatment are not important policy considerations;
indeed, they are often central to policy debate. The difference, however, is that in the UK,
such considerations are not founded in a written constitution. Rather they are contingent
political considerations that depend, for example, on the configuration and mobilization
of interest group pressures, public attitudes, and bureaucratic traditions that vary from
issue to issue. It may well be that any of those groups may have expectations of security
or equality which may ultimately undermine the establishment of risk-based practices by
government or non-state actors in a particular sector. However, the navigation of
those expectations hinges in the end on politics, rather than any conflict with deeply
entrenched governance norms within the UK polity.
Second, the case studies also suggest that the patterned emergence of risk-based
approaches to governance is also functionally dependent on accountability demands. In
France, while a number of dedicated risk agencies were created with transparency built
into their guiding missions, their role has been constrained to giving expert advice.
Responsibilities for policymaking and routine monitoring and enforcement, however,
have been firmly retained by opaque and weakly accountable central government depart-
ments. That institutionalized opacity has reduced the need for explicit risk-based ration-
ales to justify the limits of state intervention or implementation failure. Indeed, explicit
acknowledgment of the limits of the French state to provide security and meet policy
goals potentially conflicts with the important principle of maintaining “public order.”
Moreover, risk-based policymaking rationales actively threaten the authority of civil
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servants and elected officials to embody and represent the “general interest” based on
their respective professional judgement or democratic mandate.
Consequently, where ex-ante identification of potential failure has been mandated,
such as in food safety inspection, “fudge factors” have been introduced to direct gover-
nance attention to those issues most likely to tarnish the reputation of the state. Other-
wise, effort is put into horizon scanning for weak signals of failure, or ex-post crisis
management style interventions that tend to externalize blame onto individual officials
rather than the state itself. It is conceivable that moves towards devolution in France may
compound the problems of adopting risk-based approaches if the regions use security as
a means to gain political power at the expense of Paris, but that hypothesis needs testing
through systematic research.
In Germany, dedicated and transparent risk agencies have similarly been generally
constrained to giving expert advice. However, German accountability demands work
against risk-based approaches for setting policy goals and implementation in different
ways to France. Explicit recognition of the limits of what governance can, or should
achieve, do not create the kind of reputational problems for the state or threaten officials
as they do in France, because the German constitution is more focused on the protection
of the individual than the state. However, in place of the mystique underpinning the
authority of civil servants and elected officials in France, the Rechtsstaat places the courts
in a central position to more openly oversee decisionmaking, which amplifies normative
uncertainties in applying risk-based approaches. Indeed, the fragmentation of political
and legal accountabilities across different levels of the state and courts can lead to wide
inconsistency in approaches to policymaking, implementation, and enforcement, and can
constrain the emergence of risk-based approaches to governance. It is not, perhaps,
surprising that solutions have been sought through Germany’s corporatist traditions or
political fixes.
In the UK, however, the institutionalization of transparent systems of scrutiny, per-
formance, and accountability has encouraged the reconception of ever more governance
domains and practices in terms of risk. This development was starkly pronounced with
the adoption of risk as a rationalizing logic for policymaking and enforcement by regu-
latory agencies across policy domains in the absence of direct electoral mandate. Like-
wise, in the face of performance measurement regimes, local government and other
public services have adopted risk-based approaches to help account for the limits of
policy implementation and service delivery. Even in traditionally opaque UK central
government departments, civil servants have been taking an interest in risk-based deci-
sionmaking as a way of navigating enhanced accountability demands while limiting
blame for failure. It is possible, as in France, that more nuanced patterns of risk-based
governance will emerge with limited regional devolution. That possibility would need
systematic investigation, but in the absence of a written constitution, it might be expected
that such patterns will be driven by contingent political considerations from issue to
issue.
This examination of the patterned emergence of risk-based approaches to governance
reaches deep into, what might be termed, the “psychopathologies” of how national
polities deal with their limits and failure. Indeed, put in psychoanalytic terms, if the UK
solution to the problem of accountability is an ex-ante rationalisation of the limits of the
possible, the French solution is to deny that failure is possible, but to neurotically search
for signals of failure that could damage the authority of the state. By contrast, Germany
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appears to be in a state of inner conflict, with accountabilities diffused through a highly
fragmented administrative and legal system that is unable to reach consistent agreement
on what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable failure. Such categorization may verge
on crude humour, but it does suggest that if we want to explain the varied adoption of
risk-based approaches to regulation across these three countries, we need to go beyond a
simplistic argument that there are inevitable leaders and laggards with any reforms to the
tools of government. Instead, we need to examine the institutional contexts in which risk
can do more than simply serve as a synonym for hazard, but also serve as a way of
reframing the limits of what governance can, and should, achieve.
5. Conclusions
While risk has been promulgated as a major organizing concept for governance reform,
much of the discussion has been normative in character. This article is only a first step
towards greater reflection on the factors driving or hindering its emergence in different
national contexts. Systematic empirical analysis across policy domains is needed if the
hypothesis developed in this article is to be fully tested. Nonetheless, the country over-
views point towards a distinct set of factors shaping or constraining the emergence and
institutional patterning of risk-based governance across the three countries. In particular,
we draw five conclusions.
First, far from being a universal phenomenon, the emergence of risk as an organizing
concept of governance varies across countries. In the UK, risk has both come to dominate
a wide range of policy domains far removed from traditional risk concerns, as well as
shape information-gathering, policymaking, and implementation processes. In France
and Germany, however, the tools of risk analysis have generally been confined – albeit
with some notable exceptions – to traditional policy domains associated with risk and to
processes of risk assessment, rather than policymaking and implementation.
Second, the analysis suggests that emerging patterns of risk-based governance are
closely related to the extent to which ex-ante rationalisations of adverse governance
outcomes are compatible with entrenched governance norms and accountability struc-
tures of national polities. For example, risk-based approaches to governance have a poor
fit in those polities where the state has “hard-wired” constitutional responsibilities to
provide security for its citizens or where the definition or identification of adverse
outcomes creates irreconcilable constitutional conflicts. Indeed, the analysis suggests that
it is not so much the character of risk problems that determine their method of gover-
nance, but rather, the character of the polity that determines whether or how problems
are framed as “risks” to be governed in the first place.
Third,whilewehave tried todevelop a strong institutional argument for the emergence
of risk-based philosophies of governance, we also recognise that the trends are slow,
complex, and often contradictory. We could not hope to capture inevitably complex and
varied governance norms and accountability demands across policy domains and country
contexts given our limited evidence base. Moreover, we anticipate that well-rehearsed
factors, such as the demands of international markets, interest group pressures, public
attitudes, bureaucratic preferences, and supranational governance regimesmay also play a
significant role in shaping the adoption of risk-based rationales from case to case.
Fourth, and relatedly, our analysis raises the question of the role of the EU, given the
putative variety that we have identified within just three member states.As we note above,
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the EC is increasingly promoting risk-based approaches in some policy domains, but
their adoption has so far proved to be uneven, and, of course, the EU has only limited
competencies in many policy domains. Detailed empirical research is needed to better
understand the factors shaping the adoption or otherwise of risk-based approaches by the
EU and consequent impacts on member states. This article, however, does point to some
hitherto ignored factors that may contribute to conflicts between member states in the
formulation of Directives, as well as the ways in which Directives are implemented in
practice in member states.
Finally, our analysis offers a new research direction for thinking critically about the
extent to which risk-based rationales for coping with the limits of what governance
interventions can, and should, seek to achieve, are compatible with alternative rationali-
ties that are deeply embedded within national polities. There is, therefore, a need for
comparative case studies to study how far the emergence of risk-based approaches is
related to how the identification and acceptance of adverse governance outcomes are
handled across policy domain and country contexts. Indeed, further study may find that
in the psychoanalytic spectrum between the “rationalising” and the “neurotic” state, there
are other psychopathologies of handling adverse outcomes that the logics of risk-based
governance could reveal.
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